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Tn u1b not sxmjt 4w,~ ra to
I. Inmbriln
In Yar4b v Ccnwueatb,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia espoused its
policy of "truth in sentencing" that requires the elimination of speculation from
sentencing determinations.3 The Yarbrt4 court held that, upon request of a
defendant, capital sentencing juries should be given an instruction that the
defendant is ineligible for parole even when the Commonwealth relied solely on
the vileness aggravating factor.' Prior to Ykibiro, the rule prohibited jury
instructions "that the defendant would be digi e for parole or could 1a* from
an executive act of pardon or clemency."' The court explained that the policy
behind the prior rule was to prevent jury speculation about parole that might
* JD. Candidate, May2002, Washington & Lee University School of LaUw B-A, Texas
A&M University. Special thanks to WA my family, friends, members of the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse, and Roger D. Groot.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Qxm to linpim Ycs, at http'J/www.cyber-
nation.com/victory/quotations/subjects/quotestrutLhtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2001).
2. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
3. Yarbrough v. Commonweath, 519 S.E.2d 602, 605-07 (Va. 1999) (holding that capital
sentencing juries should be instructed, upon request of a defendant, regarding parole ineligibility
4. Id at 616. The Yabr# court stated this was a case of first impression. Id at 612.
Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Srpms v Scuah Qmin and the
abolition of parole in Virginia, the court had not been presented with a capital murder conviction
in which the Commonwealth had relied onlyon the vileness aggravating factor and the defendant
was parole ineligible. Id at 611; sealo Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154 (1994) (holding
that due process requires that defendant's parole ineligibility be made clear to the jury when theprosecution offers evidence of future dangerousness). The court found that Simim was not
binding in this case because the holding in Sbrar required that when a defendantsflmvedaug -
is is at issue, he is entitled to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. Yarimo, 519 S.E.2d at
612.
5. Yambxouj, 519 S&E2d at 613 (citing uion v. Commonwealh, 247 SE.2d 704,706 (Va.
1978)); seJones v. Commonwealth, 72 S.E.2d 693,696-97 (Va. 1952) (finding juries should not be
instructed onpost-senteni matters);seeCoward v. Commonwe"ath, 178 S.E. 797, 800 (Va. 1935)
(stating that what happens after sentencing is of no concern to sentencing juries).
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
cause it to impose a harsher penaltythan it might otherwise.6 Therefore, the goal
in each rule is the same: to protect defendants from receiving harsher sentences
as a result of jury speculation. In Fishta& v Caw aw m1&, 7 the court extended
the "truth in sentencing" rationale to sentencing proceedings against non-capital
defendants. The rule announced in Yabra* was codified in Section 19.2-264.4
of the Virginia Code and provides that, upon request of a defendant who has
been convicted of an offense punishable bydeath, "a juryshall be instructed that
for all Class 1 felony offenses committed afterJanuary 1,1995, a defendant shall
not be eligible for parole if sentenced to imprisonment for life." 9
This article will examine a series of Supreme Court of Virginia decisions that
appear to be inconsistent in terms of the court's analyses and conclusions,
especially in light of the "truth in sentencing" rationale. The Supreme Court of
Virginia emphasized the importance of "truth in sentencing" in Yabg and
Fishba&. Unfortunately, the court has failed to adhere to that principle. For
example, subsequent to the abolition of parole in Virginia, Class One felons not
sentenced to death are sentenced to life in prison. ° Such a defendant is not
eligible for anytype of parole. 1 Further, hopes for executive clemencyare slim.12
Therefore, he will effectively be sentenced to death in prison. Yet, the Supreme
Court of Virginia's decisions have made it nearly impossible for defendants to
introduce evidence accurately describing life in prison." Additionally, the court
has precluded defendants from arguing that a life sentence means the defendant
will die in prison. 4 This article asserts that the rationale announced in Yay 4
6. YaSnxo, 519 S.E2d at 613.
7. 532 S±.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
8. See Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000) (mandating that juries
should be instructed about parole ineligibility in non-capital cases when the defendant has no
chance of being paroled).
9. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (vfichie 2000). This section also provides that where
a sentence of death is not recommended in a trial by jury, the defendant shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment. Id
10. S 19.2-264.4.
11. S&VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Mchie 2000) (providing, in part, that "[any person
sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995,
shall not be eligible for parole upon that offense"); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (vfichie 2000)
(prohibiting geriatric release for Class One felons convicted of offenses committed on or after
January 1, 1995).
12. Sw ifra Part IVA
13. Seg 4dlyBurms v. Commonwealh, 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001) (holding that evidence
regarding general nature of prison life is not proper rebuttal to the Commonwealth's case for future
dangerousness when the Commonwealth offers only evidence relating to defendant's prior
convictions and unadjudicated bad acts); Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565 (Va. 1999)
(holding that prison life evidence is not relevant mitigating evidence); Cerrix v. Commonwealth,
513 SE.2d 642 (Va. 1999) (same).
14. SeLovittv. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 878 (Va. 2000) (holding trial court properly
excluded defendant's "death in prison" closing argument).
[Vol. 14:1
VIRGINIA CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE
and Fishbha was correct, but has not been consistently applied, if applied at all,
to subsequent decisions made by the court.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Virginia has been inconsistent, allowing
the admission of some "good victim character" evidence but not "bad victim
character" evidence." The court has also been inconsistent in its decisions
regarding capital murder indictments.16
HI. Exanir t f the SqmrtCW Cnf fViga's IniMi9tent Coar
A. 7"r ,,Tnh SrmwRamdg-El ig Sp0.zdatn m QpI S dwg
The Supreme Court of Virginia has made small steps toward allowing juries
a glimpse into the future of a life sentenced capital defendant by requiring a jury
instruction regarding parole ineligibility upon request of the defense. This "life
means life" instruction was meant to further the goal of truth in sentencing, by
eliminating speculation by capital sentencing juries.
1. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth
The defendant in Yarmqgv Canrmuadb was convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death."7 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court
erred in failing to grant defendant's requested instruction that he would be
ineligible for parole if given a life sentence." The court affirmed Yarbrough's
capital conviction but vacated the death sentence and remanded his case for a
new sentencing hearing.19
The question before the court was "whether the granting of an instruction
on parole ineligibility is required in a capital case in which the Commonwealth
relied on the vileness aggravating factor alone.""0 The court held that a parole
ineligibilityinstruction was necessary and explained that "(t]he underlying con-
cern is whether issues are presented in a manner that could influence the jury to
assess a penalty based upon 'fear rather than reason."'21 The court found that a
jurymaynot be informed of post-sentencing procedures if that knowledge could
lead a jury to impose a harsher sentence than it might otherwise." The court
acknowledged that there was a long standing rule in Virginia, first announced in
Coumd v (wv ,23 that it is error "to instruct the jurythat the defendant
15. See i6 Pat V3.
16. See fra Part V.C
17. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth 519 S.E2d 602, 607 (Va. 1999).
18. Id at 612.
19. Id at 617.
20. Id at 613.
21. Id (internal citation omitted).
22. Id
23. 178 SE. 797 (Va. 1935).
2001]
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would be eligible for parole or could benefit from an executive act of pardon or
clemency.
24
The court stated that although Yarbm4 presented a situation converse to
the one in Cmu Y Va4b was still a case "where information about post-
sentencing procedures is needed to prevent a jury from imposing a harsher
sentence than it otherwise might render out of speculative fears about events that
cannot transpire." 2s In a case in which the capital murder defendant is convicted,
the juryhas onlytwo choices for sentencing: life and deathL2 6 The court found
that, without knowledge that a defendant is parole ineligible, the jury might
erroneously speculate on the possibility of parole and select the death penalty
7
Therefore, the court found that the same policy goals underlie the old rule,
barring instruction on parole status, and the new rule, mandating instruction of
parole status upon request of defendant. The impetus behind each rule, there-
fore, is that jury speculation should not lead to the unwarranted imposition of
harsher sentences. 8 For these reasons, the court determined that "Yarbrouh
was denied his right of having a fully informed jury determine his sentence. 9
2. Fishback v. Commonwealth
Yakao left open the question of whether the Cmi rule was still viable
in non-capital felony cases "where, for example, a defendant subject to a maxi-
mum term of years for a specific crime would serve that entire sentence before
being eligible for geriatric parole." The Supreme Court of Virginia answered
that question in Fish ku V I31 In Fishh/&, the court held that "juries
shall be instructed, as a matter of law, on the abolition of parole for non-capital
24. Yai na,519S.E.2dat613;seeGowardv.G ommon.wea 178SE.797(Va. 1935). In
Couant the juryin a drunk driving case made an inquiy as to 'what time the defendant would get
off while he was confined in jaiL" Camv 178SE. at798. Te trial court responded to the jury
byexplammg the rules regarding good behavior" sentence reduction. d T e court held this vas
error because [the] jurors should have been told that it was their duty, if they found the accused
guilty, to impose such sentence as seemed to them to be just. What might happen afterwards was
no concern of theirs." Id at 800.
25. Ya a, 519 S.E2d at 613; se Cb=4 178 SE. at 799 (holding that jurors should not
be instructed on the parole status of defendants).
26. Se VA. ODE ANN. 5 192-264.4(A) (Michie 2000) (providing that when a sentence of
death is not recommended in a trial by juy, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment).
27. Ymabmso, 519 SE.2d at 616. In footnote 10, the court stated that "these conclusions
arise not merely from reasoned logic, but have been repeatedly confumed through empirical
research." Id at n.10.
28. Id at 615.
29. Id at 616.
30. Idat 615.
31. SeeFisbbackv. Gomronweal.h, 532 SE.2d 629,634 (Va. 2000) (holding that'juries shall
be instructed, as a matter of law, on the abolition of parole for non-capital felonyoffenses commit.
ted on or after January 1, 1995").
[Vol. 14:1I
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felonyoffenses committed on or afterJanuary 1, 1995."32 If the defendant's age
allows for possible geriatric release, the juryshall be instructed on the provisions
of the applicable statute.33 The court found that jurors do not need to receive an
instruction that defendants could be released based on good behavior credits, as
it is too speculative a consideration. 4
The Fishbzck court stated that "truth in sentencing" is a desirable goal in the
judicial process." The court also expressed the need to keep the judicial branch's
job of assessing punishment separate fromthe executive branch's job of adminis-
tering that punishment.' The executive branch no longer has the discretion to
grant or deny parole, as the statute abolishes parole." In accordance with the
"truth in sentencing" rationale, the Fishlade court stated that "it simply defies
reason that this [parole ineligibility] information ought not to be provided to the
jury by an instruction of the trial court."3"
The court concluded that an instruction regarding credit earned for good
behavior is not required, reasoning that at the time of sentencing a jury has no
factual basis from which to factor the provisions for good behavior credit into
its sentencing decision and "such an effort would.be an exercise in pure specula-
tion."39 For the same reason, the court held that the Commonwealth is not
permitted to offer an instruction regarding executive clemency The Fishlu
court reiterated the "truth in sentencing" policy underlying its opinion and the
importance of a well-informed jurywhich bases its decision on reason ratherthan
fear, facts rather than speculation: "Speculation bythe jury is inconsistent with
32. Id at 634.
33. Id; se VA. CODE ANN. 5 53.1-40.01 (vfhie 2000).
34. Fi/hbai, 532 S.E.2d at 634.
35. Id at 632.
36. Id
37. FisAr*, 532 SE.2d at 633. Viginia Code Section 53.1-165.1 provides in part, '[a]ny
person sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after January 1,
1995, shall not be eligible for parole upon that offense." VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Mlchie
2000).
38. Fiwhbaz, 532 S.E.2d at 633. Defendants convicted of non-capital offenses, however, are
not ineligible for parole in all instances. The provisions of Sections 53.1-40.01 and 53.1-202.2 are
implicated and conditionally allow earlyrelease and sentence reduction in everynon-capital felony
conviction. Id These sections deal with geriatric parole and good behavior credit, respectively. Id
The court determined that trial courts must give instructions regarding the abolition of parole for
non-capital defendants according to the facts of a particular case. Fis/hbr&, 532 S.E.2d at 634.
"Thus, when a defendant's age and the permissible range of punishment for the offense in question
totally negate the applicability of Section 53.1-40.01, the jury will be instructed that the defendant
is not eligible for parole in accordance with Section 53.1-165.1." Id If the defendant is eligle for
geriatric parole, an instruction will be given in accordance with the applicable provisions of Section
53.1-40.01, as well as an instruction that parole is otherwise abolished. Id
39. Fisha&de, 532 S.E.2d at 634.
40. Id at 634 n4.
2001]
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a fair trial both to the defendant and the Commonwealth.""1 The elimination of
speculation regarding executive clemency was not a new concept for the court.
In D)b v Q rmunmrn',2 the court concluded that the trial court erred by
permitting the Commonwealth to state to the jury "Give him the death penalty.
What does life imprisonment mean to a criminal with pardon so easy?" The
court found this statement was improper and that "such a reflection upon the
executive department as a reason for imposing the death penalty could not be
justified, and should not under any circumstances be tolerated.""
The Supreme Court of Virginia made a significant start in helping juries
make informed decisions in capital sentencing. Unfortunately, the momentum
did not last long.
B. Modig A uay Frmmthe Tnab
1. Lovitt v. Commonwealth
Robin Lovitt ("Lovitt") was indicted for, and convicted of, capital murder
A jury sentenced him to death based on the finding that he presented a future
danger.6 On appeal, Lovitt contended that the trial court erred in preventing
him from arguing that he would die in prison during dosing argument.4" The
"death in prison" argument is that capital defendants are not eligible for parole
and, therefore, will die in prison. The Supreme Court of Virginia found no error
in the trial court's decision to exclude the argument. 8 The court determined that
there was no evidence to support the argument Lovitt wished to make and
deemed it "speculative in nature."" The court, relying on the fact that prisoners
41. Id at 634.
42. 149 SJE. 414 (Va. 1929).
43. Dingus v. Commonweah, 149 SE. 414,415 (Va. 1929) (finding that "no juyshould be
urged be to impose the death penalty upon any accused person because because the attorney for
the Commonwealth thinks that pardons in this State are easily secured").
44. Id
45. Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 870 (Va. 2000) (holding that trial court
properly exchled defendant's "death in prison" closing argument).
46. Id
47. Id at 878.
48. Id
49. Id Note that the court has attempted repeatedly to eliminate speculation on post-
sentencing evidence. SeFishbackv. Commonwealth, 532 S.E2d 629,634 (Va. 2000) (finding that
"[s]peculation by the jury is inconsistent with a fair trial both to the defendant and the Common-
wealth"). S graUy Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 SXE2d 602 (Va. 1999) (standing for the
proposition that jury speculation should not lead to the unwarranted imposition of harsher
sentences). Note also that Section 192-2652 of the Virginia Code requires the court to take judicial
notice of laws. SAVA. CODE ANN. S 192-2652 (Mfichie 2000). Sections 53.1-40.01,53.1-165.1, and
192-264.4(A) are clearly "laws." Thus, the law is that a capitally convicted defendant must be
sentenced by his jury to death or "imprisonment for life," and he cannot be paroled from the latter
sentence. Judicial notice is a substitute for evidence. The "evidence" suppon a "death in
prison" argument, therefore, is the law which the court is required by stature judicaly to notice.
[Vol. 14:1
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sentenced to life imprisonment without parole could possibly receive executive
clemency, found the "death in prison" argument incorrect as a matter of law.s°
Thus, the Supreme Court of Vhiginia found that Lovitt was properlyprecluded
from arguing that he would die in prison if given a life sentence without possibil-
ity parole." A jury recommending a death sentence based on future danger-
ousness must find "there is a probability that the defendant would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society"" Lovitt argued, in his attack on the jury's
determination of his future dangerousness, that prison societywould be the only
society to which he could pose a future danger, as he was ineligible for parole.
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, stating that Section 192-264.2 did not
constrain society to mean only prison society' Justice Keenan declined to
"rewrite the statute to restrict its scope.""5
2 Bums v. Commonwealth
The Supreme Court of Virginia once again veered from Yairwgx's "truth
in sentencing" rationale in Bum v C a rkh.s' William Joseph Burns
("Burns") was convicted of capital murder and the trial jury recommended a
sentence of death based on its finding of both vileness and future dangerous-
ness." At the penalty phase of Bums's trial, the Commonwealth presented
evidence relating to his future dangerousness.58 To establish the future danger-
ousness aggravator, the Commonwealth presented evidence of Bums's rior
convictions and unadjudicated bad acts." In mitigation, Burns offered the
testimony of family members regarding abuse he suffered as a child, a former
inmate who described Bums as a "peacemaker," and a county jail employee who
testified that Bums had never been violent during his incarceration there and was
always respectful? °
Bums argued on appealthat it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit
evidence about prison life in a maximum securityprison in rebuttal to the Com-
50. Loia, 537 S.E2d at 878; see ifra Part IV.
51. Id
52. Id (citing VA. CODE ANN. 5 192-2641 O(ichie 2000)).
53. Id
54. Id at 879.
55. Id Justice Keenan, speaking for the court, did not note that the statute need not be
rewritten buit merelyread in conjunction with other applicable statutes to properlyinfer the meaning
of "society." Sw ir6 Pa I.
56. SwBums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E2d 872,893 (Va. 2001) (holding that circuit court
did not err in refusing to admit evidence about prison life in a maximum securityprison in rebuttal
to the Commonweakh's evidence of future dangerousness).
57. Id at 877.





monwealth's evidence offered to prove future dangerousness.61 Prior to trial, a
subpoena duces tecum was issued to a regional director of the Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections at Bums's request.62 The subpoena requested "documents
or records describing the daily inmate routine, general prison conditions, and
securitymeasures at the Red Onion Correctional Center and Wallens Ridge State
Prison,... and videotapes" of those facilities. 63 The Commonwealth moved the
court to quash the subpoena and the trial court granted the motion after a
hearing on the matter."
At the penaltyphase of his trial, Bums sought to introduce evidence of the
conditions of incarceration at the prisons mentioned in the subpoenas in order
to rebut the future dangerousness evidence presented bythe Commonwealth.65
Because the court indicated it would grant a motion to quash subpoenas issued
to the wardens of the two "super-max" prisons, counsel for Burns gathered
newspaper artides regarding the security of super-max prisons and the life of a
prisoner at one of those facilities." The articles were proffered as "what the
testimony would show," but the court did not admit the testimony.7
The Supreme Court of Virginia found Burns's argument, that evidence of
prison life was proper rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of future
dangerousness, unpersuasive." The court concluded that prison life evidence
was not proper rebuttal as the Commonwealth offered no evidence regarding the
nature of prison life for a convicted capital murderer, the number of violent
crimes committed in prison or the chances of a prisoner escaping. 6 The court
first relied on the principle stated in Canc v Cxmmvzwmth," namely that the
United States Constitution "does not limit 'the traditional authority of a court to
exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior
record, or the circumstances of his offense."'' Thus, the court deemed "the
relevant inquiry is not whether Bums axwd commit criminal acts of violence in
61. Id at 892.
62. I
63. Id
64. Id Subpoenas were also issued to the wardens of those facilities, however, the Common-
wealth's motion did not reach those subpoenas. Id The court made no ruling on them neverthe-
less, the court indicated it would make the same ruling if the Commonwealth included them in its
motion. I at 892 n.14.
65. d at 892.
66. Id
67. Id at 892-93.
68. Id at 893. The Buns court cited Lozi when rejecting the defendant's argument that
Section 19.2-2642 restricted the consideration of "society" to prison society. Id
69. Id The Burm court also noted that evidence regarding prison life was not admissible as
mitigating evidence, citing Walke and (Chirix. See sqpm note 13.
70. 513 SE.2d 642 (Va. 1999).
71. Bums, 541 S.E.2d at 893 (citing Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999)).
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the future but whether he udd"n The court determined that the focus of the
inquiry in future dangerousness is the individual defendant and a specific crime,
and that prison life evidence relating to the general nature of a maximum security
facility was not relevant to that focus.73
In sum, the Bwn court would admit prison life evidence to rebut future
dangerousness onlyin a one for one correlation with evidence presented bythe
Commonwealth. For example, if the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the
nature of prison life, the likelihood a prisoner could escape, or other specific
evidence of prison life, then evidence of prison life might be used as rebuttal.74
Because the Commonwealth introduced onlyevidence of Bums's prior criminal
record and prior unadjudicated bad acts to prove future dangerousness, Burns
was precluded from prison life rebuttal7
C PrisonLiEsideeIs Not Ptrq Miti Etidd v"in
Vbg px CAp zAl S"MagOrMM4~
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia's "truth in sentencing"
rationale has led the court to allow an instruction on parole ineligibility, the court
has not allowed defendants to present general evidence concerning prison life to
rebut the Commonwealth's future dangerousness evidence. In Cmm and
Walkerv C nama th,76 cases decided prior to Yab and Fishck, ,the court
found that prison fife evidence was not admissible as mitigation. Then, in Vurn
v Cbrak," the court mischaracterized mitigation evidence as anti-future
dangerousness evidence and allowed the Commonwealth to rebut that evidence
with future dangerousness evidence. V&'&nwas a disconcerting glimpse at the
inconsistent nature of the court's subsequent decisions.
1. Cherrix v. Commonwealth
Brian Lee Cherrix (Cherrix) vwas convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death by a jury on a finding of both vileness and future dangerous-
ness. At trial, Cherrix sought to present evidence regarding prison life and how
it might reduce or eliminate the probability of future dangerousness through the
testimony of several Virginia corrections officials, an expert penologist, a crimi-
72. Id SeegmnUyVA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.2 and 264.4(C) (Michie 2000).
73. Bum, 541 S.E2d at 893.
74. Id
75. Id
76. Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E2d 565, 574 (Va. 1999) (holding that prison life
evidence is not relevant mitigating evidence).
77. Vimsonv. Commonwealth, 522 SE.2d 170,178 (Va. 1999) (finding the trial court did not
err in allowing the Commonwealth to present rebuttal evidence regarding the probability of the
defendant's futnure dangerousness).
78. Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 SE.2d 642, 647 (Va. 1999) (holding that prison life
evidence is not proper mitigating evidence).
20011
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nologist, a sociologist, and an individual serving a life sentence in the custody of
the Virginia Department of Corrections."' Cerrix proffered the testimony of
these witnesses and the trial court found the evidence to be immaterial as mitiga-
tion evidence; the court refused to subpoena the witnesses.' ° The Supreme
Court of Virginia agreed with the trial court that prison life evidence was not
relevant mitigating evidence. 1 In support of its decision, the court stated that
while the United States Constitution guarantees the defendant in a capital case
the right to present mitigating evidence, it does not limit "the traditional authority
of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's
character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense." 2 The court also
relied on Section 19.2-264.4(B) of the Virginia Code which "vests the trial court
with the discretion to determine, subject to the rules governing admissibility, the
evidence which maybe adduced in mitigation of the offense." 3 The court found
that the evidence proffered by the defendant was not specific to his history or
experience, but merely demonstrated the "general nature of prison life.""'
2. Walker v. Commonwealth
Darick Demorris Walker ("Walker") was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death based upon a finding of both vileness and future dangerous-
ness." In the penalty phase of his trial, Walker attempted to introduce the
testimony of a Virginia Department of Corrections official regarding the condi-
tions of prison life, especiallylife without parole in a maximum securityprison s6
Walker argued the evidence was relevant and admissible, as it would mitigate
against his receiving the death penalty.' The Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
agreed, citing ( x.88
79. Chnix, 513 S.E.2d at 653.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 605 n.12 (1978) (holding that a death penalty
statutory scheme that precludes consideration of relevant mitigating factors is unconstitutional)).
83. Id (iting Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E2d 797, 804 (Va. 1979) (holding that a
death sentence one dendant maybe upheld when a sentence of life imprisonnt or less has
been imposed upon a co-defendant)); se aso VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(B) (vlchie 2000)
(providing, in part, that "[in cases of trial byjury, evidence maybe presented as to anymatter which
the court deems relevant to sentence").
84. rnkix, 513 S.E.2d at 653. The court distinguished the evidence proffered by Cherrix
from the prison life evidence admitted by the court in Sko'er v Sab Cm*din. Id at n.4; Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 US. 1 (1986) (holding that prior incarceration of defendant was admissible
as rebuttal to the State's case for future dangerousness). The Caur court noted that the evidence
in Skipper addressed the defendant's ability to conform or his experience in conforming to prison
life and the evidence in Oyrki did not. Chwix, 513 S.E.2d at 653 n4.
85. Waker v. Commonweah, 515 S.E2d 565, 568 (Va. 1999).
86. Id at 574.
87. id
88. Id; see sira Part II.C 1.
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3. Vinson v. Commonwealth
Dexter Lee Vinson ("Vinson") was convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death upon a finding bythe juryof vileness and future dangerousness. 9
In the penaltyphase of Vinson's trial, to prove future dangerousness, the prose-
cution introduced evidence that in 1987, the defendant had previously assaulted
a police officer trying to arrest him; in 1988, the defendant had assaulted a
corrections officer who was attempting to move him to another cell; and, in
1997, defendant had resisted arrest so violently that it took eight police officers
to control hin-.2 The defendant's mitigation evidence included testimony of his
mother, his step-father, his high school band instructor, his construction work
supervisor and a minister.91 Additionally, the defendant introduced the testimony
of two mental health experts as mitigation 2 The experts testified that the
defendant suffered from "intermittent explosive disorder" and, therefore, was
unable to conform his conduct to the law at the time of the crimes.93 In rebuttal,
the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of another mental health expert
who agreed that while the defendant exhibited the characteristics of intermittent
explosive disorder, "almost all violent criminals fit that categoryof illness."94 The
expert also testified "that there is at least a fifty percent chance that defendant
would commit another violent offense in the next five years." 5
On appeal, the defendant argued that it was error for the Commonwealth's
expert to testify in rebuttal about defendant's future dangerousness "when the
defense's medical experts did not testify directlyabout future dangerousness."
6
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial court did not err in allowing
the Commonwealth to present rebuttal evidence regarding the probability of the
defendant's future dangerousness.97 The court reasoned that "even though
defendant's medical experts did not use the term 'future dangerousness' as
applied to defendant, they opined about defendant's mental condition and
offered excuses for defendant's behavior." 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia was incorrect in characterizing Vinson's
expert testimony as anti-future dangerousness evidence and allowing the Corn-
monwealth to rebut it with further future dangerousness evidence. Mitigation
89. Vinson v. Commonweahh, 522 S.E2d 170, 172-73 (Va. 1999).
90. Id at 175.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id; se abo VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(B) (Mlchie 2000) (identifying a defendant's
inability to conform his conduct to the law as a mitigating factor).
94. Virsc, 522 S.E2d at 175 (internal quotations omitted).
95. Id (internal quotations omitted).





evidence looks back at the defendant and his offense and seeks to convince the
sentencerthat, despite the finding of anyaggravating factor, the defendant should
be spared the death penalty, while future dangerousness evidence looks forward
and is used to predict the future behavior of the defendant. Thus, the Supreme
Court of Virginia was probably correct in Cfmrbi and Walker when it hel that
prison life evidence was not proper mitigation evidence. In Vmon, the court
improperly allowed the Commonwealth to introduce future dangerousness
evidence to rebut defendant's mitigation evidence. It is interesting and indicative
of the court's confusion that it decided Vimcnjust nine months after (Yxi and
five months after Waker. In both Chm-'bi and Waker, the court sharply distin-
guished rebuttal and mitigation evidence and held that prison life evidence was
not proper mitigation evidence. However, in Vinmn, the court appeared not to
understand the difference between future dangerousness evidence and mitigation.
D. Prison L 0 E'side= is Pr, Rwttal to &h Cmmmuaz1's E'cidfef qf
Fmwm Dvgennss
Taken together, a series of United States Supreme Court decisions suggest
that defendants have a due process right to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence
when the Commonwealth seeks to prove future dangerousness." The trial court
in Gvanrv Fkrida sentenced the defendant to death." In making its decision,
the court relied in part on a pre-sentence report containing confidential informa-
tion that was not disclosed to the defendant."°' In a plurality opinion, the United
States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the defendant's due process
rights to impose a death sentence based on information that the defendant "had
no opportunity to deny or explain."0 2 In Skrpev Scut Qmin%, the United
States Supreme Court found that when prosecutors seek death on the basis of
future dangerousness, due process mandates the defendant be allowed to intro-
duce evidence of prior conformity to incarceration to rebut the State's
evidence. 3 The principle announced in Ganer and Sk r that fundamental
due process required that a defendant be allowed to rebut evidence the sentencer
might have relied upon'in its decision was reaffirmed in Smrnm v Sawth
Camli 04 In Sinn& , the Court held that due process requires that a defen-
99. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 US. 349, 362 (1977) (holding that basing a death sentence
on information that the defendant had no opportunity to "deny or explain" violated defendant's
due process right); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US. 1, 5 (1986) (holding that due process
mandates defendant be allowed to introduce rebuttal evidence when prosecutors seek death based
on future dangerousness); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,162 (1994) (holding that due
process requires that the defendant be allowed to introduce evidence of parole ineligibilityw en the
prosecution raises the issue of defendant's future dangerousness).
100. Gvznh, 430 US. at 350.
101. Id
102. Idat 362.
103. Sktper, 476 US. at 5 n.1.
104. Sinma, 512 US. at 154.
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dant's parole ineligibility be made clear to the jury when the prosecution offers
evidence of future dangerousness.' 5  Thus, in light of Gmim, Skiper and
Simm, a defendant has a constitutional due process right to rebut the Common-
wealth's case for future dangerousness.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has been consistent in one thing: constru-
ing the capital sentencing statutes in such a waythat precludes defendants from
introducing evidence of prison life. The following section attempts to demon-
strate that the court's reading of these statutes is incorrect.
II 7 x Tnad" For Cavi Capa MurerDje iwn Vvm ,
SodeyMa ThriscnSoiety
Section 19.2-264.4(q of the Virginia Code allows a capital sentencing jury
to recommend a sentence of death only if one or both aggravating factors are
found. "  The pertinent language of the section reads as follows:
The penalty of death shall not be u ed unless the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probabilitybased
upon the evidence of the prior history of the defetidant... ihat he
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a contin-
uing serious threat to society '0
In L ou, the defendant asserted that the Commonwealth's evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the jurys finding of future dangerousness. '°' As part of the
argument, Lovitt asserted that because he was ineligible for parole, the only
societyrelevant for purposes of determining his future dangerousness was prison
society.1
9
The court rejected his argument and determined that it is incorrect onlyto
consider prison society when determining future dangerousness even when a
defendant has been sentenced to life without the possibilityof parole.110 In light
of the applicable sections of the Virginia Code it is difficult to understand how
the Supreme Court of Virginia could conclude that society is not limited to
prison society The L ozit court was certainly correct that the literal language of
Sections 19.2-264.4(C) and 19.2-264.2 does not restrict "society" to prison
105. Id at 171.
106. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(C) (Mlhie 2000) (requiring a finding of vileness and/or
future dangerousness before a death sentence maybe recommended); see VA. GODE ANN. 5 19.2-
264.2 (Michie 2000) (same).
107. S 192-264.4(p.
108. Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866,878 (Va. 2000).
109. Id
110. Id The analysis of the Louitcourt determining that the relevant "society" was not limited
to prison societywas affirmed bythe recent Supreme Court of Virginia case Bwun v wmmu1&
Burns v. Commonweakh, 541 S1.2d 872 (Va. 2001). Sae swayJeffreyD. Fazio, Case Note, 14
CAP. DEF.J. 131 (2001) (analyzing Burns v. Commonealth, 541 SUE2d 872 (Va. 2001)).
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society. It is imperative, however, to read statutes together with other relevant
statutes in order to better understand their meamng.
Parole had not yet been abolished at the time Sections 19.2-264.2 and
264.4(C) were enacted.' Prior to the enactment of Section 53.1-165.1, "soci-
ety," for purposes of Sections 19.2-264.2 and 264.4(Q, was probably inclusive
of all persons in the general population."' After Section 53.1-165.1 abolished
parole for defendants convicted of felonies committed on or after January 1,
1995, Sections 19.2-264.2 and 264.4(C) remained unchanged. The enactment of
Section 53.1-165.1 necessarilyirnpacted the interpretation of Sections 19.2-264.2
and 264.4(Q, as convicted capital defendants sentenced to life will never re-enter
the general population or "society" as previously defined."4 The abolition of
parole thus acts as a restriction on the scope of Sections 19 2-264.2 and 264.4(C).
Section 53.1-40.01 further narrows the scope of Sections 19.2-264.2 and
264.4(C), as it expressly excludes (lass One felons from receiving geriatric
release."' Therefore, once a defendant is convicted of capital murder, the only
alternative to a death sentence is a sentence of life without parole or release. It
follows that the only societyto which a convicted capital defendant would ever
pose a future danger is prison society. In light of the statutorychanges since the
passage of Sections 19.2-264.2 and 264.4(p, therefore, it is error to interpret
society" as encompassing both prison and non-prison populations. Such an
interpretation is illogical and ignores the rules of statutory construction.
The Lout court's conclusion that "society" in Sections 19.2-264.2 and
264.4(C) was not limited to prison society was affirmed bythe court in Burn."6
In addition to affirming a defective definition of "society," the Bwm court
determined that the relevant inquiry was not whether a defendant aw/d commit
criminal acts of violence but whether he wudw" 7 Even assuming that is the
correct inquiry, if "society" means prison society, evidence about incarceration
is necessary for the jury to make a fully informed decision as to whether a
defendant would pose a future danger to prison society. The "would" inquiry
was answered erroneously by the court in two different ways.
111. HENRYCAMPBELLBLACK, MA, CONsTRUCrIONAND INTERPRETAT!ONOF THE LAWS
60-61 (West Publishing Co. 1896). "[fTo harmonize laws with laws, is the best method of interpre-
tation... where two statutes on the same subject, or on related subjects, are apparently in conflict
with each other, theyare to be reconciled, by construction.., and validityand effect given to both,
if this can be done without destroying the evident intent and meaning of the later act." Id
112. Code Section 191-264.2 was enacted in 1977. SoeVA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.(2lfichie
2000) (setting out aggravating factors that must be found for a juryto impose a sentence of death).
113. Code Section 53.1-165.1 was enacted in 1994. SaeVA. CODE ANN. $ 53.1-165.1 (hMchie
2000) (abolishing parole for defendants convicted of first-degree felonies committed on or after
January 1, 1995).
114. SwVA. CODE ANN. 553.1-40.01 (.ichie 1998) (prohibiting geriatric reease for Class One
felons convicted of offenses committed on or after January 1,1995).
115. 5 53.1-40.01.




First, whether a defendant dd pose a danger depends on whether he will
have an opportunity to do so. To conclude otherwise is to conclude that a
capital sentencing jury mayspwdate in making its sentencing decision, as no one
is able to predict what a person u/udd do without knowing what he uill/ate Ade
wonwv*iy to da In other words, one must answer the cwd question before
answering the 'u/dd question. As the Supreme Court of Virginia stated in
Fishhixk, "[s]peculation by the jury is inconsistent with a fair trial both to the
defendant and the Commonwealth."1
Second, the Burs court determined the relevant inquiry to be whether a
defendant "would" pose a future danger. The wording of the inquiry makes it
a test of character rather than opportunity. In capital sentencing hearings, the
Commonwealth at least uses prior bad acts to prove that a defendant would
commit bad acts in the future. This is why the Skroer opinion is so important
when a court is trying to answer the "would" question. Skqer holds that, as a
matter of constitutional law, a defendant's past behavior while incarcerated
should be admitted if it is available and the defendant offers such evidence. 19
The Court in Skipper found that such evidence is relevant, as "a defendant's
disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is
itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing
determination." 20 Most capital defendants have previouslybeen incarcerated or
have at least been incarcerated while awaiting trial. Furthermore, most capital
defendants behave well while incarcerated. 2' Howa defendant acted previously
in a structured environment is more predictive of his behavior in a structured
environment than his past behavior in an unstructured environment. Thus, this
type of evidence is more germane to the "would" question than other types of
character evidence, such as prior bad acts, and should be admitted to answer that
question.
IV. Misuzdenr g orMiapp1v the Trth in SertgRatiomle
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia started well in Yarbrg and
Fishhixk, the trend has not continued in its subsequent decisions. The same idea
of ridding speculation from capital sentencing has either been misunderstood or
misapplied bythe court. The result is case lawthat appears to be divorced from
the original "truth in sentencing" rationale.
118. Fishback v. Commonweakh, 532 S.E.2d 629,634 (Va. 2000).
119. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US. 1, 8 (1986).
120. Id at 7.
121. Not all defendants behave well In Vimom; the defendant assaulted a correctional officer
who was attempting to move him to a cell The Commonwealth presented this evidence to prove
future dangerousness. Vinson v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170, 175 (Va. 1999).
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A. Lovitt and Exa7&iw C.rrffxy
In Yabn*gi, the Supreme Court of Virginia adamantly stated that capital
sentencing juries should not have to resort to speculation when making critical
sentencing determinations.'22 In L ott, decided onlyabout fourteen months after
Yadmo, the court characterized the defendant's requested "death in prison"
dosing argument as speculative in nature because defendants sentenced to life
without parole are eligible to receive executive clemency. This article asserts that
a capital defendant who receives a life sentence has verylittle chance of receiving
executive clemency.
In fact, only six defendants sentenced to dawd in Virginia have had their
sentences commuted.' The standard for a capital defendant who receives a
death sentence seems to be that some evidence of actual innocence is required
for a defendant's sentence to be commuted from death to life. The sentences of
Joseph Giarratano,Jr., Herbert Bassette,Joseph Payne, Sr., and Earl Washington,
Jr. were commuted from death to life only when doubt about their actual guilt
was developed.'24 In Earl Washington, Jr.'s case, the Governor commuted his
sentence from death to life in 1994.125 He was subsequently pardoned in 2000,
when DNA evidence completely excluded him as the murderer and he was fully
122. SesaqmPartIIA1.
123. SeDeh S$roa5 Cwmaetin Vni, RiO-. TIMES-DISPAT-, Nov. 15,1998, at A17,
aui/ableat 1998 WL2051048. In February 1991, Governor L. Douglas Wilder granted a conditional
pardon to Joseph M. Giarratano, Jr. Id In January 1992, Herbert Russell Bassette's death sentence
was commuted. In November 1996, the death sentence ofJoseph PatrickPayne, Sr. was commuted
to a sentence of life without parole. Id The death sentence of William Aristede Saunders was
commuted by Governor George Allen in September 1997. Id; seeDonald P. Baker, Gilnri Stp
ExaaiFist TmMeiralIfIhs cImaae Cieh WASH. POST, May 13,1991, at AO1, aw zd e at 1999
WL 17002680. Calvin E. Swann was granted executive clemency by Governor James Gilmore in
May1999. Id; see Tim McGlone, Matthew Dolan, &Bill Sizemore, A Ner-Fatal lrjtiar HowOn
Mmn's WmrfidMwrnrCamniuiaA lmrt Cast HimHis L ( andL ai d State 7at HddHimfor l8 Yamn
t Qustnls Faith m theDaabPotk>r VA. PILOT, Jan. 22,2001; at Al, audiladeat 2001 WL 9708206.
The death sentence of Earl Washington, Jr. was commuted by Governor Wilder in January 1994.
Id Governor James Gilmore granted Washington a full pardon in February2000 after exhaustive
DNA tests excluded Washington as the person who committed the rape and murder of Rebecca
Lynn Williams. Id
124. See Dath Sentarz Cbmmaai in Vbjia, supra note 123, at A17. In February 1991,
Governor L. Douglas Wilder granted a conditional pardon to Joseph M. Giarratano, Jr. Id In
January 1992, Herbert Russell Bassette's death sentence was commuted. In November 1996, the
death sentence of Joseph PatrickPayne, Sr. was commuted to a sentence of life without parole. Id;
seMcGlone, s"q'm note 123, at Al. The death sentence of Earl Washington, Jr. was commuted by.
Governor Wilder inJanuary 1994. Id GovernorJames Gilmore granted Washington a full pardon
in February 2000 after exhaustive DNA tests excluded Washington as the person who committed
the rape and murder of Rebecca Lynn Williams. Id
125. Se McGlone, supra note 123, at Al. The death sentence of Earl Washington, Jr. was
commuted byGovemor Wilder injanuary 1994. Id GovernorJames Gilmore granied Washington
a full pardon in February2000 after exhaustive DNA tests excluded Washington as the person who
committed the rape and murder of Rebecca Lynn Williams. Id
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pardoned. 6 The implication arising from these cases is that doubt about the
guilt of a convicted capital defendant who receives a death sentence will not
reduce his sentence to less than life. These cases, therefore, suggest that it takes
something extraordinary, such as absolute proof of actual innocence, to obtain
executive clemency resulting in a sentence less than life.
Furthermore, the Lot court's reliance on the existence of executive
clemency to forbid a death-in-prison dosing argument is unconstitutional. In
Caldudl v MissispiA the United States Supreme Court faced a similar
situation.' In CGdudl, the Court decided wher a prosecutor's argument to
the jurywas in violation of the Eight Amendment's heightened "need for reliabil-
ity in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case."' 29 Defense counsel's dosing argument emphasized the gravity of the
capital sentencing jury's decision.'3 In an attempt to alleviate some of this
burden from the jury, the prosecutor then responded in his closing argument that
defense counsel was overemphasizing the jury's sentencing power because its
decision would be reviewed on appeal... The Court concluded that "it is consti-
tutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a
sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere."'
In its analysis, the Court reiterated the need for reliabilityin capital sentenc-
ing determinations: "This Court has repeatedly said that under the Eighth
Amendment 'the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments
requires a correspondingly greater degree of scnrtiny of the capital sentencing
determination."" Thus, reliabilityand responsibilityare the touchstones of the
Court's Eighth Amendment analysis." 4 The Court stated that sentencer discre-
tion is consistent with the Eighth Amendment's "need for reliability" in death
determinations when sentencers view their power to make death sentencing
decisions as an "awesome responsibility."'
The Court noted that individuals chosen to serve on capital sentencing
juries are in very unfamiliar territory and are expected to make a critical and
126. Id
127. 472 US. 320 (1985).
128. Caldwellv. Nfississippi, 472 US. 320,328-329 (1985) (holding "that i is constitutionally
Mrmissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led
olieve that the responsibilityfor determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests
elsewhere").
129. Id at 323 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US. 280, 305 (1976)).
130. Id at 324.
131. Id at 325.
132. Id at 328-29.
133. Id at 329 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 US. 992,998-99 (1983)).
134. Id
135. Id at 330 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina 428 US. 280, 305 (1976)).
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uncomfortable choice.136 Jurors are instructed on law, confronted with evidence
and arguments, and then asked to make a judgment on whether another person
should die-all without significant guidance." In such a situation, "the uncor-
rected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death
will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact
choose to minimize the importance of its role.""'
In light of the Ga/U l decision, it seems the Lniut court's reliance on the
existence of executive clemencyto forbid a death in prison closing is unconstitu-
tional, as well as adverse to the "truth in sentencing" rationale. This is because
"it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination
made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere."' 39
The Lozint court refused the defendant's "death in dosing" argument based upon
its belief that the argument was speculative, in that it did not account for the
possibilityof executive clemency." Therefore, in relying on executive clemency
in its refusal of defendant's argument, the Lozitt court permitted a death sentence
to be imposed by reliance on the vain hope that relief would be available in
another forum. This is exactly the situation the Court in Ca/dU held to be
unconstitutional.
In Frye v w,4 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that, in light
of Cadrl the Commonwealth is barred from commenting on the power of the
trial court and the Supreme Court to set aside a jury's verdict, as such comments
could "lead a jury to believe the sentencing responsibility lies 'elsewhere."' 42
Reliance on the vain hope that the defendant will receive executive clemency in
order to deny a defendant's request to argue "death in prison" likewise thwarts
the policy goals enumerated in Cakdmi. It is imperative that the jury should
believe it holds the ultimate power to sentence the defendant.
Additionally, it is important to note that, in Virginia, the power to commute
capital sentences is vested in the Governor." This means that executive clem-
encyis completelyremoved fromthe judicial process. Fishbadk, in fact, expressed
the necessityof keeping the judicial branch's job of sentencing separate from the
job of the executive branch in administering that sentence."' Accordingly, the
L ozit court erroneously relied on the speculative possibility that the defendant
136. Id at 333.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Gdrd4b 472 US. at 328-29.
140. Lovitt v. Conmorwealh, 537 S.E2d 866, 878 (Va. 2000).
141. 345 S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1986).
142. Frye v. Commonweath, 345 S.E.2d 267, 285 (Va. 1986) (quoting Gtada!, 472 US. at
328-29 (1985)).
143. SwVA. ODE ANN. S 53.1-229 (flchie 2000); seealso VA. Q)?.,T. art. V, S 12.
144. Fishbackv. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 632 (Va. 2000).
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might receive reprieve from another branch of the State's government. The
Supreme Court of Virginia in Yarba b held that "the juryshould not be permit-
ted to speculate on the potential effect of parole, pardon, or an act of clemency
on its sentence because doing so would inevitably prejudice the jury in favor of
a harsher sentence than the facts of the case might otherwise warrant."14 The
Supreme Court of Virginia prohibits jurors from speculating on post-sentencing
matters because of the distinct possibilitythat such speculation would be prejudi-
cial to the defendant. It is likewise impermissible for the trial court to rest a
death sentence on speculative post-sentencing matters.
B. Ca m wrmal Has BeenAllou' toA gue PinLje in its Last Closing
In Bwn, the Commonwealth argued in its closing argument "that, if Burns
receives life imprisonment, he would pose a continuing danger to the prison staff
and could escape from prison."'6 As noted above, the court precluded Bums
from introducing evidence of prison life as rebuttal to the Comnionweakh's
evidence of future dangerousness. 7 The Commonwealth, however, was allowed
to argue prison life evidence in its closing argument, as the Supreme Court of
Virginia found that the defense had not made a timely objection. 4
In Sdmitt v Qcumad, 49 the defendant was again precluded from
introducing prison life evidence and the Commonwealth again argued prison life
in its closing argument."s The Commonwealth argued that Schmitt would have
a "wonderful life" in prison if he received a life sentence."' The defendant
asserted that the trial court erred in failing to give a curative instruction or grant
a mistrial regarding the comments by the prosecutor, however, the Supreme
Court of Virginia did not reach the merits because the defendant did not make
a timely objection.'
52
It is a well settled rule that arguments are improper when unsupported by
evidence introduced at trial. In McCoy v Cmmmuaaik,"' the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed a murder conviction in part due to prejudicial statements made
by the Commonwealth during its dosing argument." In his argument, the
145. Yarbrough v. Commonv-akb, 519 S.E.2d 602,615 (Va. 1999).
146. Burns v. Commonwealh, 541 SE.2d 872, 896 (Va. 2001). The Commonweahh's
argument occurred during its rebuttal dosing argument at the end of the penaky phase, thereby
maldng itimpossible for the defense to rebut. 1dat 896 n.17.
147. Soespa Part ID.2.
148. Bran, 541 S.E.2d at 896 n.17.
149. 547 S.E.2d 186 (Va. 20011).
150. Schmitt v. Commonwealh, 547 S.E2d 186,199-200 (Va. 200[ D (finding the defendant
could not introduce prison life evidence).
151. Id at 200.
152. Id
153. 99 SE. 644 (Va. 1919).
154. McCoyv. Commonwealh, 99 SE. 644,646-47 (Va. 1919) (holding that dosing argument
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Commonwealth's Attorney gave his theory of how a weapon was found near the
decedent.' The court found that the statement was unsupported by the evi-
dence, was highlyprejudicial to the accused, and precluded a replybythe defense,
as it was made in the final dosing argument."6 "Such statements are prejudicial
to the accused, and if not promptlycorrected and the juryinstructed to disregard
them are grounds for reversal."'' Additionally, in D* v C rrmrt a1t," the
court emphasized that the Commonwealth's closing argument was improper if
not supported by evidence produced at trial.' 9 "[Elveryperson charged with a
crime is entitled to have his case determined solely bythe evidence produced at
his trial"1 Thus, when the Commonwealth argues prison life in its dosing, it
is violating fundamental issues of fairness by precluding defendant his right to
rebuttal and by asking the juryto speculate without evidence.
Unfortunately, this situation, in which the defendant is precluded from
introducing evidence of prison life and the Commonwealth uses its dosing to
argue prison life, is not unique. It is precisely this situation that the Supreme
Court of Virginia has failed to rectifyin its case law and seems to actuallyencour-
age in its rulings. The defense is unable to introduce evidence of incarceration
that would rebut such unfounded remarks made bythe Commonwealth. There-
fore, the Commonwealth is able to benefit from and encourage the jury's precon-
ceived notions of prison life while avoiding opening the door for defendants to
bring in evidence to correct any misunderstandings the jury mayhave regarding
prison life and to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence regarding future danger-
ousness. Such a circumstance leads to speculation by the jury of facts that are
not even in evidence because the court has deemed them to be irrelevant as
rebuttal to future dangerousness. Speculation by jurors is what the court has
allegedly attempted to eliminate from capital sentencing procedures. In keeping
with the spirit of "truth in sentencing," capital sentencing jurors must be in-
formed of the nature of prison life. In keeping with the spirit of fairness, the
Commonwealth must not be allowed to preclude a defense rebuttal by arguing
prison life in its final dosing.
C Yarbrough andFishback u. Lovitt ani Bums: A Cnpvatize Study
Ii is difficult to believe the same Supreme Court of Virginia that decided
Yarbri and Fishhza, decided L owat and Burn. In Yabiwb, the court held that
in the penaltyphase of a trial, when the defendant has been convicted of capital
made by Commonealth that was unsupported by the evidence was grounds for reversa4.
155. Id at 646.
156. Id
157. Id
158. 149 SE. 414 (Va. 1929).
159. Dingus v. Commonwealth, 149 SE. 414,416 (Va. 1929) (standing for the proposition
that trial judges should require prosecuting attornes to limit their argumnet to evidence).
160. Id at 415.
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murder, the trial court shall instruct the jury that the defendant is parole ineligi-
ble.16' The Yybmu court emphasized the importance of "truth in sentencing,"
for if the sentencing decision were made "*xw this knowledge of [parole
ineligibility] the jury may erroneously speculate on the possibility of parole and
impose the death sentence."' The Yar*# court's goal was to eliminate the
"unwarranted imposition of harsher sentences."'
The court in Fishhic picked up where Yarb=# left off and held that
sentencing juries should be instructed as a matter of law on the abolition of
parole for non-capital felony offenses committed on or afterJanuary 1, 1995.'
Once again the Supreme Court of Virginia emphasized the goal of "truth in
sentencing." 16 The court stated that a jury should not have to perform the
critical and difficult task of making sentencing determinations "without the
benefit of all significant and appropriate information that would avoid the
necessity that it speculate or act upon misconceptions concerning the effect of
its decision."'6 The court also noted that "in the context of achieving the goal
of 'truth in sentencing,' it simply defies reason that this information [parole
ineligibility] ought not to be provided to the jury by an instruction of the trial
CoUrt."1
67
The court inLoi, as discussed previously, found that the trial court did not
err in refusing defense counsel's request to argue in closing that defendant would
die in prison if sentenced to life. The court deemed the argument to be too
speculative in nature to grant, as it was possible for the defendant to receive
executive clemency. 69 After a juryhas been instructed that a life sentence means
a life sentence with no possibility of parole, a "death in prison" argument in
dosing merelyhlps to remove residual doubt from jurors' minds that defendant
may not serve his entire prison term. It helps jurors remember that a sentence
of life does carry great consequences for the defendant. The "truth in sentenc-
ing" rationale actually supports the idea of "death in prison" arguments, as such
arguments have the potential to assist jurors in basing their sentencing decisions
on reason rather than fear. Without such an argument, jurors are more likelyto
speculate that a defendant would somehow gain release from prison. Thus,
admitting a "death in prison" dosing argument would strengthen the instruction
regarding parole abolition and thereby further the court's policy goal of fully
ormed capital sentencing juries.
161. Yarbrough v. Commonweakh, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va. 1999); sealsosqmz Part I.A.
162. Yanfx , 519 S.E.2d'at 616.
163. Id
164. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 SE.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000); see aso sa Part fl.A..
165. Fashizk, 532 S.E2d at 632.
166. Id at 633.
167. Id
168. Lovit v. Commonwealth, 537 SE.2d 866,878 (Va. 2000); sewaos"ma Part ILB.1.
169. Lod, 537 S.E2d at 878.
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The court in Yadmb concluded that "[w]here information about potential
post-sentencing procedures could lead a juryto impose a harsher sentence than
it otherwise might, such matters maynot be presented to the jury."70 This is at
the heart of the "truth in sentencing" rationale. Using this rationale, it follows
that post-sentencing matters should be disclosed when jurors would impose a
harsher sentence without the disclosure. Such post-sentencing information
includes prison life evidence that rebuts the Commonwealth's evidence of future
dangerousness. It is impossible for a jury to make a fully informed sentencing
decision as to whether a defendant serving a life sentence without the possibility
of parole would pose a future danger to others when the court withholds evi-
dence of how maximum security facilities are administered.
In concluding that evidence of prison life is irrelevant to the determination
of future dangerousness, the Bun court disregarded the rationale of "truth in
sentencing." The court based this conclusion on semantics, stating that the
question of future dangerousness turns on whether a defendant uud pose a
future danger and not whether he cadd" The court's analysis is founded on
pure speculation, the very thing the Supreme Court of Virginia attacked in
YabAwgb, stating that this is "a case where information about post-sentencing
procedures is needed to prevent a jury from imposing a harsher sentence than it
otherwise might render out of spwdatiwJfs abw ewnis that amnwt .-
A juror would have to imagine a hypothetical in which the defendant was not in
a super-max prison in order to determine if a defendant ucdd pose a future
danger. This type of speculation blatantlyviolates "truth in sentencing" and the
goals enumerated in Yadm*.
V. QherInxnaumsiz
A. ReiitirgBurns
The Bwnr court concluded that for prison life evidence to be admissible to
rebut the Commonwealth's evidence of future dangerousness, the Common-
wealth must first introduce evidence that directly addresses the general nature of
prison life. 73 Thus, the court has set up a system wherebythere must be a "one
for one correlation." In Vimc, the court found that the Commonwealth could
rebut defendant's mitigation evidence with future dangerousness evidence, as the
mitigation evidence "looked like" anti-future dangerousness evidence. 4 The
court found that the characterization of the evidence did not change its nature.17 s
In Burn, however, the court has broken the general heading of future dangerous-
170. Yarbrow, 519 S.E.2d at 613.
171. Burns v. Conumonweakh, 541 S.2d 872, 893 (Va. 2001).
172. YaSmw&1 , 519 S.E2d at 613 (emphasis added).
173. Bwn, 541 S.E2d at 893.




ness evidence into sub-parts, meaning that a defendant must rebut exactly the
aspect of future dangerousness the Commonwealth puts forward. The court
reitemted the Bum theory of proper future dangerousness rebuttal evidence in
Sdnmi In Sdnitt, the court concluded the defendant was properly precluded
from introducing evidence of prison life to rebut the Commonwealth's conten-
tion of Schmitt's future dangerousness, as "the Commonwealth did not present
evidence concerning prison security or the nature of prison confinement im-
posed on a defendant who has been convicted of a capital murder offense." 76
The narrow opportunityof rebuttal is in direct contrast with the court's previous
holding in Virsm Nor does this decision comport with the idea of "truth in
sentencing." Section 19.2-264.4(B) states that "evidence may be presented as to
any matter which the court deems relevant to sentence.""r' The Bum court
evades that language by saying the relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant
awUdpresent a danger to societyin the future but whether he mW/7s Byframing
the question of future dangerousness that way, the court has convinced itself that
prison life evidence is not relevant for sentencing determinations.
The Supreme Court of Virginia appears to have an amorphous concept of
relevance that allows it to be flexible in maling determinations regarding what
evidence is admissible and what is not. This flexibilityis useful to the court when
determining that victim character evidence is relevant to sentencing determina-
tions.
B. Victim ChraaerEtidmaw
The court determined that a victim's prior criminal record is not relevant todetermine the future dangerousness or vileness of a defendant and is therefore
not relevant."' The court, however, concluded that victim impact evidence is
admissible.' In Waks v Cnmmuadtb, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
"victim impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecu-
tion in Virginia."1"' The court reasoned that victim impact evidence may be
probative of the defendant's depravity of mind, a component of the vileness
aggravator.182 The Wes court relied heavilyon the United States Supreme Court
decision in Payn v Temssa s3 in maling the determination that victim impact
176. Schmitt v. Commonwealh 547 SE.2d 186, 199 (Va. 200[1D.
177. VA. GODE ANN. S 192-264.4(B) (vflchie 2000).
178. Bun, 541 S.Eld at 893.
179. See Lenz v. Commonweakh, 544 S.E2d 299, 307 (Va. 2001) (finding victim's priorcriminal record is not reevant in a capital sentencing hearing).
180. See Weeks v. Commonvakh, 450 S.E2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994) (finding victim impact
evidence relevant in capital sentencing hearings).
181. Id See tUy MatthewL Engle,DweIPmns L iitatm an VianInpra Esdma 13 CAP.
DEF. J. 1 (2000) (arguing victim impact evidence is irrelevant in capital sentencing hearings).
182. Weaks, 450 S.E2d at 390.
183. 501 US. 808 (1991).
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evidence is relevant in capital cases.'" Payn posed a different set of facts than
do most capital cases in which the Commonwealth wants to introduce victim
impact evidence. In Payn, the victim evidence included the testimony of the
victim's mother who described the impact on her grandson who had been
stabbed by the defendant and witnessed the murder of his mother and sister.'
In Weks, the victim impact evidence included testimony of the victim's widow
and state troopers who worked with the decedent.' 8 The witnesses "testified
about the profound effect the killing had on [the victim's] surviving family and
those with whom he worked."" 7 Effectively, the testimony was "good victim
character" evidence, as it implies that the victim had some special value that
made his life more special than others. Furthermore, in contrast to Payr, the
testimony in Waes was much further removed from the defendant and his
offense.
In Bea* v CWM=M,,s1s the defendant was tried without a jury and asked
the trial court to onlyconsider victim impact evidence of the victim's families.1'
The court responded to this request bystating it would consider each statement
to determine if the relationship of the dedarant to the victim was sufficient to
warrant consideration, as it "was 'mindful of the types of statements that would
be inappropriate for its consideration."'' ° The Supreme Court of Virginia
reviewed whether the trial court erred in admitting and considering the victim
impact evidence and determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the evidence.' 9' In mng its determination, the court gave consid-
erable weight to the fact that Beck had a trial without a jury "'A judge, unlike a
juror, is uniquely suited bytraining, experience and judicial discipline to disregard
potentially prejudicial comments and to separate, during the mental process of
adjudication, the admissible from the inadmissible, even though he has heard
both.'"" Thus, the court ruled the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as it
was fullycapable to sort the relevant from the irrelevant. " In Sdmnit a jurytrial,
the court refused to modifyits previous ruling in W is and found that the trial
court did not err in admitting "victim impact evidence.""
184. WAs, 450 S.El2d at 389-90; sePayne v. Tennessee, 501 US. 808, 811 (1991) (holding
that victim impact evidence is not per se violative of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution).
185. Pay, 501 US. at 811.
186. WAs, 450 S.E2d at 389.
187. Id
188. 484 S.E2d 898 (Va. 1997).
189. Beck v. Commronwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898,903 (Va. 1997) (finding trial court did not err
in admitting victim impact evidence).
190. Id at 905.
191. Id at 906.
192. Id (quoting Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 279 S.E2d 155, 157 (Va. 1981)).
193. Id
194. Schmitt v. Comnnwealth, 547 S.E.2d 186,195 (Va. 200[1) (internal citations omitted).
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The court, using its flexible definition of "relevance" has determined that
a victim's prior criminal record is not relevant in a capital sentencing hearing.
Lenz v Cm9suezW" involved an inmate-on-inmate kiling.1" On appeal, the
defendant argued the trial court erred bynot allowing the admission of evidence
regarding the victim's criminal record. 7 Effectively, the defense wanted to
present "bad victim character" evidence. The defendant asserted that Section
19.2-264.4(B) required evidence of the victim's record to be admitted because it
was one of the circumstances surrounding the offense.'" The Lem court found
that no error had been committed because the prior record of the victim spokeneiher to the defendant's vileness nor to his future dangerousness.199 In
Renwgjmnv mwkh,200 decided five months after Les, the Supreme Court
of Virginia again ruled the trial court did not err in refusing to admit into evi-
dence the victim's prior criminal history" The court's reasoning follows: "[The
victim's] prior conviction had no relevance to the issue whether the defendant's
acts were vile, inhuman, or showed depravity of mind, and the victim's criminal
record was not relevant to the issue whether the defendant would constitute a
serious, continuing threat to society."2"
If the question of relevance is whether the evidence relates to a defendant's
vileness or future dangerousness, then victim impact evidence ("good victim
character" evidence) is as irrelevant as is the victim's prior criminal record ("bad
victim character" evidence). The testimonyof the victim's widowin Wbs spoke
to neither defendant's vileness nor to the possibilityof his future dangerousness.
For the same reasons, the testimony of the victims co-workers was equally
irrelevant. Application of the Wks' framework of relevance to the admissibility
of victim impact evidence clearly demonstrates the court's policyof inconsistent
decision-making.
C Mdoiwa Iiiamt and Bums
In Paym v QiCawmmz, 2 °3 there were two victims and two trials.? Each
trial produced two death sentences per victim, for a total of four death
sentences. 20 1 In the first trial ("the Fazio case"), Payne was convicted of two
195. 544 S.E.2d 299 (Va. 2001).




200. 551 S1.2d 620 (Va. 2001).
201. Rmington v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E2d 620,635 (Va. 2001).
202. Id (citing Lem, 544 S.E2d at 307).
203. 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999).
204. See Payne v. Commonweath, 509 SX.E2d 293, 296 (Va. 1999).
205. Pa)M 509 SJE2d at 301.
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counts of capital murder.2" The first count in the Fazio case was under Section
18.2-31(4) (robbery) and the second count was under Section 18.2-31(5) (rape)
of the statute.0 7 In the second trial ("the Parham case"), the defendant was again
convicted of two counts of capital murder.208 The first count in the Parham case
was under Section 18.2-31(5) (attempted rape) and the second count was also
under Section 18.2-31(5) (object sexual penetration).2°9
The Paym court addressed the issue of whether there can be more than one
death sentence imposed when there is only one victim, or stated another way,
"whether the imposition of multiple death sentences violates the provision of the
Fifth Amendment ... thatno person 'shall... for the same offense... be twice
put in jeopardyof life or limb." 210 The Paym court began its analysis of the issue
by stating that "the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that
the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple
punishments for the same offense." M  Next, the court stated the test to deter-
mine whether there is more than one offense is "'whether each provision requires- ~~~- 212 r.. hst  h o
proof of a fact which the other does not. In applying test, the court
found that in theFazio case, Payne violated two distinct statutoryprovisions, that
each statutory provision required proof of a fact the other did not, and, there-
fore, the killing of Fazio constituted two capital offenses. 2" In the Parham case,
the court used the same reasoning to determine that the killing of Parham
constituted two capital offenses, as each subpart (attempted rape and object
sexual penetration) required proof of a fact that the other did not.214 Thus,
Payne's four death sentences for two victims were upheld.
21 1
In Po/d v C,216 the court reversed defendant's death sentence,
as the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to amend the capital
nuirder indictment.217 The original indictment returned bythe grand jurycharged
Powell with a single count of capital murder-the gradation crime was the com-
mission or attempted commission of robbery, in violation of Section 18.2-





210. Id at 300.
211. Id (internal quotations omitted).
212. Id (quoting Blocddurger v. United States, 284 US. 299, 304 (1932)).
213. Id at 301.
214. Id
215. Id
216. 552 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 2001).
217. Powell v. Commonwealth, 552 S.E2d 344, 357 (Va. 2001) (finding trial court erred in
allowing Commonwealth to amend the capital indictment, so that it changed the nature of the
original charge).
218. Poud, 552 S.E.2d at 356.
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two new gradation crimes: "and/or" commission or attempted commission of
rape and the commission or attempted commission of sodomy."' The court
stated that because the Commonwealth used the term "and/or," the indictment
was not revised but expanded "to include a new and additional charge of capital
murder" so that "Powell could have been convicted and sentenced on one count
of murder under Code [Section] 182-31(4) and another count of capital murder
under Code [Section] 18.2-31( 5).""20 Therefore, the court held the trial court
erred in allowing the amendment to the indictment, as it "materially changed the
nature of the offense originally charged."2 '
The Payne court determined that each subsection and each subpart of the
capital murder statute is a separate offense. Therefore, the indictment used in
Poud1 was multiplicious, as it alleged three offenses in a single count. It seems
the holding in PouWd is consistent with the holding in Paynm.
In Burm, alleging the amended indictment was multiplicious, the defendant
objected to the Commonwealth's amendment of the indictment.222 The original
indictment contained two counts of capital murder. 3 Count one charged capital
murder in the commission of robbery and count two charged capital murder in
the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or object sexual penetration. 4 The
Commonwealth then amended count one to allege capital murder in the commis-
sion of robbery and/or forcible sodomy and/or rape."' The Burm court deter-
mined that the amended indictment was not multiplicious, but rather "contained
only one charge of capital murder and merely provided alternative 'gradation'
offenses." 6 The court found that the indictment did not have more than one
charge in a single count, dearly notified the defendant of the charged offense,
and the trial court did not err in den* the defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment on grounds of multiplicity. The court in Burm mentioned no
reasoning for this finding and cited onlyone case "supporting" its determination
that the indictment only contained one charge of capital murder with alternative
219. Id
220. Id at 356-57.
221. Id at 357.
222. Bums v. Cormonweah, 541 S.E.2d 872,881 (Va. 2001).
223. Id
224. Id
225. Id at 881-82.




"gradation" offenses."8 The Butrns court did not mention Paym in reaching its
decision and the reason for this telling omission is fairly obvious.
This holding in Buni is starkly inconsistent with the rulings bythe court in
Payw and Pouai. The Parw court clearlystated that everysubsection and subpart
is a separate offense; the Poud court clearly stated that the term "and/or" adds
a new and additional charge of capital murder. In Bwm, there was one count that
charged three separate offenses (according to Pa)) and those charges were
joined by the term "and/or." The court actually decided Poud! about three
months after its decision in Bum, and yet Pozwd is consistent with Pa w and not
Burs. The Bwurn court cites no relevant case law, does not explain its decision,
and severely veers from its prior decision in Pa m.
IV. CQzluion
Saying that capital jurisprudence in Virginia has not been uniform or
consistent is an understatement. This article has attempted to demonstrate how
the Supreme Court of Virginia took the stance of "truth in sentencing" when
requiring that defendants receive a life means life instruction, yet failed to apply
this policy goal to eliminate speculation in other areas of capital sentencing.
Unfortunately, the court's inconsistent case law does not stop with "truth
in sentencing." The court has also allowed the Commonwealth to present "good
victim character'" evidence, while precluding the admission of "bad victim charac-
ter" evidence. The inconsistency of the court is further demonstrated by its
decisions regarding capital murder indictments. This article hopes to highlight
these inconsistencies in order to increase practitioners' awareness of their exis-
tence and, thereby, hopefully, to provide defense attomeys tools for making
cogent arguments for adequate defense of their clients.
228. Id The case the Bum court cites is Graham v. Commonwealh, 464 SE.2d 128 (Va.
1995). The issues in Gmbanwere not germane to the issues in Bumr, and included whether a juror
should have been excluded for cause and whether a defendant can be found guiltyof ca ital murder
under Section 182-31(7) when he was the "triggerman" in the premeditated killing o one person,
but was only an accomplice in the killing of the other person as part of the same act or transaction.
Id at 128. The most pertinent sentence of Grawnreads as follows: "The GeneralAssemblygrades
murder in order to assign punishment consistent with prevailing societal and legal views of what
is appropriate and procedurallyfair." Id at 130.
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